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Abstract
Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon that may enhance stakeholders’ value if managers do not
sacrifice value to build empires.  We find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment at U.S. bank holding
companies that have higher levels of managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial
performance, and smaller asset size.  At banks without entrenched management, both asset acquisitions and sales are
associated with improved performance.  At banks with entrenched management, sales are related to smaller
improvements while acquisitions are associated with worse performance.  Consistent with scale economies, an
increase in assets by internal growth is associated with better performance at most banks.
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4389, Michael.Pagano@villanova.edu.For a discussion of why empirical studies that fail to account for risk, risk diversification, and endogenous
1
risk-taking often fail to find evidence of scale economies, see Hughes (1999), and for empirical evidence that higher
scale economies are associated with better risk diversification and lower scale economies, with increased risk-taking
and inefficient risk-taking, see Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001).
1. Introduction
Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon.  In the U.S. alone, over 8,000 bank mergers occurred
from 1980 through 1998, while the largest acquisitions, accounting for one-half of the total consolidated
assets for the 19-year period, occurred from 1995 through 1998 (Rhoades, 2000).  Countries in Europe and
elsewhere have experienced consolidation as well.  A recent study by the Group of Ten found a high level
of merger and acquisition activity in the 1990s among financial firms in 13 countries studied (Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., and
the U.S.), with a noticeable acceleration in consolidation activity from 1997 through 1999.  Of the 7,304
financial mergers documented in the study, nearly 61 percent involved banks.  This consolidation activity
created a number of large, complex financial institutions, and the number of banking firms declined in
almost every country during the decade (Group of Ten Report, 2001).
Recent studies have shown that such consolidation may enhance the value of banks in the industry
since there appear to be strong scale economies (Stiroh, 2000; Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 2000;
and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001).   The potential for scope economies between various product lines,
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although not supported by strong empirical evidence in the literature, could also drive value-enhancing
consolidation.
Skeptics, on the other hand, often accuse bankers of sacrificing value to build increasingly larger
institutions, or financial empires.  Some bank mergers have been criticized for not producing the cost
savings or increased revenues that were touted when the mergers were announced, and some academic
studies of the effects of consolidation on cost efficiency confirm the critics’ assessment (Peristiani, 1997). 
Other studies find it difficult to make a general statement about the efficiency of mergers (Shaffer, 1993). 
Studies of the effects of bank acquisitions on bank market value have generally been negative.  In critical
reviews of this literature, Pilloff and Santomero (1996) and Calomiris and Karceski (1998) note that, while
some event studies find that acquirers increase their market value, more studies find that acquirers destroy2
value.  The weight of the evidence raises the question of whether the value-enhancing incentives to merge
are being subordinated to the incentives to build a larger institution from which the managers could more
easily take greater financial compensation and consume more agency goods, such as perquisites, reduced
effort, and risk avoidance.  Presumably, the ability of managers to act on these value-destroying incentives
to merge depends on their ability to resist market discipline—that is, on the level of their entrenchment.
This paper seeks evidence on these incentives from data on publicly traded bank holding
companies operating in the U.S. from 1992 through 1994.  We proceed by characterizing managerial
entrenchment and by looking for evidence of entrenchment in the association of ownership structure and
investment opportunities with financial performance.  We use two measures of financial performance: (1) a
proxy for Tobin’s q ratio and (2) a measure of lost market value, the shortfall of the actual market value of
a bank’s assets from their highest potential market value.  We estimate the highest potential market value
of a bank’s investment in its assets by fitting a stochastic frontier of banks’ market values to their
investments in assets.  The stochastic frontier yields a “best-practice” market value of each bank’s
investment in assets as well as the short-fall between this potential value and the bank’s achieved market
value.  We then examine the relationship between financial performance and ownership structure to
identify those structures that are associated with poorer performance.  We term such structures
“entrenched.”  Ownership structure is given by the proportion of the bank owned by insiders, an indication
of their ability to resist market discipline, and by the proportion of the bank owned by outside block-
holders, an indication of the incentive of these stake-holders to monitor management.  
Using our measure of lost market value to gauge the value of managers’ consumption of agency
goods, we consider how the demand for agency goods varies with the potential value of investment
opportunities.  In particular, we examine the elasticity of demand for agency goods with respect to growth
opportunities of an institution, and we investigate whether this elasticity is higher for entrenched managers. 
In addition, we consider how the association between financial performance and ownership structure is
influenced by the value of investment opportunities.3
Next, we investigate how current asset size, recent asset acquisitions, and recent asset sales are
related to financial performance, and how these relationships differ between holding companies at which
the management appears to be entrenched and companies at which management does not appear to be
entrenched.  We look for evidence of whether a larger amount of recently acquired assets and a larger total
amount of assets are associated with worsened financial performance—especially at banks that exhibit
managerial entrenchment.  We term this association “empire building,” although it could represent other
more complex managerial objectives that erode financial performance.
Our empirical findings indicate that entrenchment at banks is associated with higher levels of
managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset size. 
Moreover, managers in general appear to have an elastic demand for agency goods when faced with more
valuable growth opportunities.  With regard to empire building, we find that increased asset size obtained
through internal growth, not by acquisitions, is associated with better performance at most banks.  On the
other hand, an increase in acquired assets appears to benefit banks with less entrenched management, while
it worsens the performance of banks with more entrenched managers.  While a larger amount of acquired
assets is associated with worsened performance at banks with entrenched management, a larger amount of
sold assets is related to improved performance.  This asymmetry between the effect of sales and
acquisitions is missing at banks in groups not exhibiting entrenchment: larger sales and larger acquisitions
both improve performance, a result predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (1989).  Our evidence is consistent
with the often cited role of scale economies in bank consolidation, but it also suggests that the benefits of
larger acquisitions are not obtained by entrenched managers, who may be using their ability to resist
market discipline to build empires.
While many studies of bank consolidation focus either on the stock-price reaction to the
announcement of the merger or on the merger’s before-and-after effects on cost or profit efficiency, our
technique shifts the investigative focus from the merger event to long-run performance and asks how the
market value of bank assets is affected by size and recent acquisitions and sales of assets.  Our paper also
makes several contributions to the empirical methods used to measure firms’ financial performance and to4
See, for example, Smith and Watts (1992), McConnell and Servaes (1995), and Gaver and Gaver (1993).
2
gauge the size of their investment opportunity sets.  While Tobin’s q ratio measures achieved market value,
the stochastic frontier technique gauges potential market value and lost market value.  The failure of a firm
to achieve its highest potential market value gives a different perspective on agency problems and control
failures and their effect on firms’ value.  While many studies use Tobin’s q ratio to measure managerial
effectiveness, the q ratio is also used in some studies to measure the relative size of a firm’s investment
opportunity set,  but this measure is biased by managers’ inefficiency.  In principle, the stochastic frontier
2
technique minimizes this bias by obtaining a measure of the highest potential value of a bank’s investment
opportunities, which doesn’t depend on the performance of the particular bank’s managers.
Section 2 reviews some of the literature on managerial ownership structure and agency problems
in banking.  Section 3 describes the empirical investigation.  Section 4 discusses our evidence of
managerial entrenchment.  Section 5 discusses how bank asset size, asset acquisitions, and asset sales are
related to performance and how these relationships vary with ownership structure and investment
opportunities.  Section 6 concludes.
2. Corporate Control Problems in Banking
Corporate control problems in U.S. commercial banking differ considerably from those of other
industries.  Bank regulation and the federal safety net account for many of these differences.  First, explicit
and implicit insurance of bank deposits and other forms of bank debt reduces or eliminates the incentive of
debt-holders to monitor bank managers and increases the importance of monitoring by regulatory
supervisors.  In addition, restrictions on branching that existed in the U.S. until very recently, the
continuing prohibition on the ownership of commercial banks by nonfinancial firms, and the requirement
that acquisitions receive regulatory approval have significantly limited the number of potential acquirers in5
In the 1980s, a large number of states began to relax branching restrictions.  The Riegle-Neal Act
3
introduced full interstate branching in 1997.  Prowse (1997) discusses the effects of branching and ownership
restrictions on the takeover market in banking.
DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon (2001) provide evidence that bank supervisory ratings account for the
4
efficiency of banks in managing risk.
Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) and Craig and Santos (1997) consider whether acquiring banks are
5
seeking to become “too big to fail,” that is, to exploit an implicit insurance guarantee of very large banks whose
failure would threaten the safety of the payments system.  Their evidence is not consistent with this supposition.
the takeover market for banks.   Prowse (1997) and Mester (1989) note that these restrictions on potential
3
buyers reduced the disciplinary role played by takeovers and have increased the importance of regulatory
supervision as a disciplinary mechanism.  Bank supervision has focused on preventing imprudent
managerial risk-taking, not necessarily on discouraging managerial inefficiency that compromises
stakeholders’ wealth.   Thus, prudential regulation and safety-net protections place substantial restrictions
4
on the market’s ability to discipline bank managers.
While most studies of corporate control and agency problems focus on nonfinancial firms, an
increasing number of studies are investigating commercial banks and other financial institutions.  Some
consider how ownership structure and managerial compensation influence risk-taking (Anderson and
Fraser, 2000; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Houston and James, 1995; Saunders, Stock, and Travlos, 1990).  
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Others examine the effect of ownership structure, compensation, and market discipline on market value
and look for evidence of managerial entrenchment.  Hubbard and Palia (1995) find a positive relationship
between pay and performance, which is stronger in banking markets where interstate entry was permitted. 
Moreover, CEO turnover increases after interstate branching deregulation.  Brook, Hendershott, and Lee
(1998) examine the effects on value of the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994 (Riegle-Neal Act), which eliminated most restrictions on interstate market entry and branching by
1997, and find that banks obtained large, statistically significant abnormal announcement returns during
the legislation’s passage.  Consistent with the expectation that a more active takeover market raises banks’
value, they also find that the value of poorly performing banks reacts more positively, and that banks with
higher insider ownership, lower levels of outside block-holder ownership, and less independent boards6
Defensive capital strategies reduce the probability of a takeover by increasing financial leverage to
6
concentrate managerial ownership (Stulz, 1988) and by reducing the benefits to an acquirer of a takeover (see, e.g.,
Billet, 1996).  Such strategies may commit managers to better performance, but they can also further entrench
managers.  The empirical evidence on how they effect performance is not conclusive.
obtain lower returns.  Apparently, managers’ ability to resist market discipline reduces the benefits of a
more active takeover market.
Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert (1999) confirm that banks with higher levels of managerial
ownership are less likely to be acquired while Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (2000) find that higher levels
of outside block-holder ownership and a more independent board increase the probability that a bank will
be acquired.  Evanoff and Örs (2001) examine the effect of liberalizing interstate entry laws and the effect
of market entry on incumbent banks’ cost efficiency.  They find that both types of events are associated
with an improvement in cost efficiency in the three years that follow liberalization.  These various studies
provide strong evidence that banking regulations, such as interstate branching restrictions, have limited
market discipline, and they suggest that managerial objectives other than value maximization may play an
important role in bank consolidation.
To the extent that managers are able to resist market discipline, they can consume agency goods. 
Agency goods can be defined broadly to include not just the consumption of perquisites, but also avoiding
effort, avoiding risk, building empires, discriminating prejudicially, and implementing strategies to
increase managers’ control and to reduce the probability of takeover.  These different “goods” can be
complements or substitutes in managers’ preference orderings.  For example, empire building and shirking
may not be complementary.  Similarly, managers’ avoidance of risk to protect their relatively undiversified
human capital may not be complementary to a defensive capital strategy undertaken to enhance their
control and job tenure.   Managers’ consumption of agency goods reduces their firms’ financial
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performance and can be undertaken only to the extent that managers are able to resist market discipline.
Our empirical strategy, which we describe in detail in the next section, first assesses how a bank’s
financial performance is related to its investment opportunities and its ownership structure in order to
identify bank characteristics associated with entrenched management.  We then investigate how recent7
Using data on commercial banks, DeYoung and Hasan (1998) and Shaffer (1998) found that it takes on
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average about nine years for the operating performance of a bank to reach the level of more established banks, so our
cutoff of six years for de novos may be a bit short.  But only 19 of our 169 bank holding companies were younger
than nine years of age and all were over six years of age as of 1992, the starting date of our analysis.
Unless otherwise indicated, the term “bank” will refer to a bank holding company.
8
Compact Disclosure is a database and software package published by Thomson Financial.
9
Since goodwill is an accounting of assets based on market value, it must be subtracted from book value to
10
obtain a proxy for replacement cost.  This point is explained by Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996).
acquisitions and sales of assets and current asset size are related to financial performance at banks with
entrenched management and banks without entrenched management.  We test for empire building by
asking whether building a bigger bank worsens financial performance—especially at banks with
entrenched managers.
3. The Strategy of the Empirical Investigation
To investigate the effect of a bank holding company’s ownership structure and investment strategy
on its financial performance, we use data on 169 highest-level bank holding companies in the U.S. that
were publicly traded, that operated over the three-year period 1992-1994, and that had been in operation
since June 1986.  We exclude holding companies that started operating after June 1986 as being de novo,
those that are headquartered in unit banking states, and those that consisted mainly of nonbank banks or
special purpose banks.   A “highest-level” holding company is not owned by another U.S. company.  
7 8
Holding company data are taken from proxy statements, Compact Disclosure,  and the FR Y-9 Financial
9
Statements filed with the Federal Reserve System.  The 169 bank holding companies in our sample ranged
in size from $160 million in assets to $215 billion in assets.
3.1. Measuring a Bank’s Financial Performance
We use two different measures of a bank’s financial performance.  The first measure, Tobin’s q
ratio, focuses on a bank’s achieved market value and is proxied by the ratio of the market value of the
bank’s assets (MVA) to their book value, adjusted to remove goodwill (BVA).   The second measure, the i i
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shortfall ratio, measures the shortfall of a bank’s market value from its highest potential market value as a8
The concept of the market-value shortfall measured by stochastic frontier techniques was proposed by
11
Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997, 2001) and was used by Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1999) to study
bank consolidation and by Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) to evaluate bank scale economies measured as an
expansion of bank output along the path that maximizes the bank’s value.  Note, this path is not generally equivalent
to the path that minimizes the bank’s cost.
proportion of the bank’s book-value investment in its assets, net of goodwill.  This measure relies on
stochastic frontier techniques to fit an upper envelope of market value to replacement cost to answer the
question, what is the highest potential market value of a given investment in bank assets?  The difference
between the envelope value and the achieved market value of a bank’s assets is its market-value shortfall,
i.e., its lost market value.
11
The highest potential value of a bank’s investment in its assets can be determined by fitting an
upper envelope of the market value of banks’ assets to their replacement cost, proxied by their book value
net of goodwill.  Letting MVA denote the market value of the i-th bank’s assets and BVA, their book value i i
less goodwill, we fit the frontier relationship,  
MVA =  " + $ (BVA ) + ( (BVA)  +  , , (1) i    i  i   i 
2
with maximum likelihood techniques, where , = < ! µ  is a composite error term used to distinguish i ii
statistical noise, <  ~  iid N(0,F ), from the systematic shortfall, µ  ($0 ) ~ iid N( 0,F  ) — i.e., the i < i µ
2 2
shortfall from the bank’s highest potential (frontier) market value.  The quadratic specification allows the
frontier to be nonlinear.  The frontier value, FMVA , is defined by the deterministic kernel of the stochastic i,
frontier,
FMVA =  " + $ (BVA ) + ( (BVA), ( 2 ) i    i  i
2
while the stochastic frontier, SFMVA, is composed of the deterministic kernel and the two-sided error i
term:  SFMVA = FMVA + < . ii i
The difference between a bank's stochastic frontier market value and the observed market value
defines the bank’s market-value shortfall, µ , which is measured in dollars of lost market value.  Formally, i
a bank’s shortfall is defined by the difference between the value of the deterministic kernel and its
noise-adjusted market value so that
µ =  S F M V A ! MVA = FMVA ! (MVA ! <), (3) ii i i i i9
where (MVA  ! < ) is the noise-adjusted, observed market value of assets.  The shortfall, µ , cannot be ii i
directly measured, so it is estimated as the expectation of µ  conditional on ,:  i i
E( µ |  , ) = FMVA ! (MVA ! E(< | , )). (4) ii i i ii  
Bauer (1990) and Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982) describe this technique in detail.
For ease of interpretation and comparison with Tobin’s q ratio, we normalize a holding company’s
inefficiency by its adjusted book value.  Hence, a bank’s shortfall ratio gives its market-value shortfall as a
proportion of its investment in assets:
shortfall ratio =  E( µ |  , ) / BVA .( 5 ) ii i i  
The shortfall ratio offers several advantages over Tobin’s q ratio as a measure of financial
performance.  First, it removes the influence of luck on performance and measures a firm’s systematic
failure to achieve its highest potential (frontier) value.  This systematic lost market value captures
differences among firms in market advantages as well as differences in managerial consumption of agency
goods.  Since managers decide in which local markets their firm should operate, we consider market
advantages as components of managerial effectiveness.  Thus, the stochastic frontier technique provides a
conceptually sound measure of managerial and firm performance.  Another advantage of the shortfall ratio
is that the frontier technique identifies lost market value rather than achieved market value; hence, it
gauges more directly than Tobin’s q ratio the extent of agency problems in an industry and permits a direct
econometric investigation of the factors that contribute to firms’ failure to achieve their highest potential
market value.
3.2. Explaining a Bank’s Financial Performance
We regress bank performance, y, on variables, x, that characterize managerial incentives derived
from bank ownership structure and investment opportunities and that characterize current asset size, recent
asset acquisitions, and recent asset sales:
y = "  +  3 " x + (½)3 3  "  xx,( 6 ) i 0j j j j k j k j k10
The data for these three ownership variables were obtained from proxy statements and Compact
12
Disclosure.
where "  = "  æ j, k.  The quadratic specification of the regression allows for non-linear effects and jk kj
interactions among the explanatory variables.  For example, it allows the correlation between managerial
ownership and performance and the correlation between asset acquisition and performance to differ by the
level of managerial ownership of the bank.  Ownership structure is characterized by the proportion of a
bank owned by insiders, the proportion of the outstanding shares granted to insiders as options, and the
proportion of shares owned by outside block-holders.  These variables are used to determine groups of
banks at which management appears to be entrenched.  The details of these hypotheses are given in section
4.  The variables characterizing bank size and asset acquisitions and sales are used to investigate empire
building.  These hypotheses are detailed in section 5.
Our explanatory variables, x, are measured as follows:
Insider ownership = the percentage of outstanding shares held by officers and directors at the end
of 1994;
Options granted = the percentage of outstanding shares represented by stock options granted to
senior managers at the end of 1994;
Outside block-holder ownership = the percentage of outstanding shares held by outside block-
holders (holders of 5 percent or more of outstanding shares) at the end of 1994;
12
Size of investment opportunity set = the highest potential value of the bank’s assets in the markets
in which it operates, which is measured using stochastic frontier techniques (described
below and defined in equation (8));
Assets acquired = book value of assets acquired over 1992-1994;
Assets sold = book value of assets sold over 1992-1994;
Number of institutions acquired over 1992-1994;
Number of institutions sold over 1992-1994;
Asset size = book value of total assets at the end of the 1994.11
Note that this frontier will differ from the frontier we used to estimate the shortfall ratio.  That frontier did
13
not control for local market conditions, since the decision of where to locate is a managerial decision and is a
component of managerial effectiveness.
The data are summarized in Table 1.
3.3. Measuring the Size of a Bank’s Investment Opportunity Set
The investment opportunity ratio has been proxied in the literature by the ratio of the market value
of a firm’s assets to their book value, i.e., by the firm’s q ratio.  However, managers’ consumption of
agency goods reduces a bank’s achieved market value, and this consumption is influenced by the size of
the investment opportunity set.  Managers can create more firm value out of a larger opportunity set, but
they can also consume more agency goods.  If agency goods are “normal” goods, a larger investment
opportunity set increases their consumption; and if their demand is “income elastic,” the value of the firm
increases less than proportionately as the size of the opportunity set increases since the consumption of
agency goods will increase more than proportionately.  We use the stochastic frontier technique to derive a
measure of a bank’s potential value that minimizes the effects of the consumption of agency goods and
other inefficiencies.  We say “minimizes,” since the frontier value of a firm’s investment in its assets
represents the “best practice” of the firm’s peers defined by the same investment in assets.  To the extent
that even this “best practice” includes the consumption of agency goods, the potential value identified by
the stochastic frontier will embody some relatively small level of lost value because of agency issues or
other sources of inefficiency.
To measure the opportunity set from which managers consume agency goods, it is necessary to
account for the investment opportunities afforded by banks’ specific local market conditions.  Hence, we
gauge the size of a bank’s investment opportunity set by asking: what is the bank holding company’s
highest potential value in the specific markets in which it operates?
13
To account for the highest potential value of a bank holding company in its local markets, we fit a
stochastic frontier of market values not just to adjusted book values, but also to local market conditions
characterized by the macroeconomic growth rate in the bank’s market and by the institution’s market  share12
Radecki (1998) presents empirical evidence that suggests that the boundaries of banking markets have
14
been expanding.  He concludes that state boundaries rather than city, county, or metropolitan area boundaries
provide “a better approximation of the boundaries of retail banking markets.”
of deposits.  The macroeconomic growth rate a bank experiences is defined by a ten-year, weighted-
average growth rate in the states in which it operates (Growth).   The weights are calculated as the share of i
the bank holding company’s assets that are held by its banks headquartered in that state.  A bank’s market
power is measured by a weighted-average Herfindahl index of deposits for these states (Herf).   These i
14
weights are calculated as the share of the bank holding company’s deposits that are held by banks that
operate branches in that state (as determined by the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits data).
We estimate the following frontier:
MVA =  " +  $  (BVA ) + (  (BVA )  + (  (BVA )(Growth) + (  (BVA )(Herf ) i    A i  AA i  AG i i AG i i 
2
     + $  (Growth ) +  (  (Growth )  + (  (Growth )(Herf ) G i  GG i  GH ii  
2
     + $  (Herf ) +  (  (Herf )  + , ,( 7 ) H i  HH i  i
2
where , = < ! µ ,  <  ~  iid N( 0,F  ), and µ  ($0 ) ~ iid N( 0,F  ).  The frontier value, NPVA , gauges a i ii i < i µ i 
22
bank’s potential value in its local markets and is given by the deterministic kernel of the stochastic frontier:
NPVA =  " +  $  (BVA ) + (  (BVA )  + (  (BVA )(Growth) + (  (BVA )(Herf ) i    A i  AA i  AG i i AG i i 
2
     + $  (Growth ) +  (  (Growth )  + (  (Growth )(Herf ) G i  GG i  GH ii  
2
     + $  (Herf ) +  (  (Herf ). ( 8 ) H i  HH i 
2
We use the frontier value, NPVA, as the measure of the size of a bank’s investment opportunity set in the i
performance regressions (equation (6)).
 In order to divide banks into groups defined by the relative size of their investment opportunities,
we define a bank’s investment opportunity ratio as the value of the deterministic kernel, NPVA, i
normalized by the adjusted book value of its assets:
Investment opportunity ratio  =  NPVA / BVA.( 9 ) ii i
The deterministic kernel computed by this technique is also used by Hughes, Lang, Moon, and
Pagano (2001) to measure a bank’s charter value—the value of its charter in a competitive auction or,
equivalently, the value of the charter to the most efficient potential acquirer.  Either a bank’s current13
market value or its Tobin’s q is often used as a proxy for charter value, but, as we have previously argued,
measures based on achieved market value are biased by the level of managerial inefficiency.  This
inefficiency is minimized by the frontier-based value.  Thus, a bank’s highest potential value in the
markets in which it operates can be used to measure the value of its charter, which is the value of its
investment opportunities (efficiently exploited).
3.4. Difference-in-Means Comparisons
Before discussing our results from estimating equation (6), Table 2A presents difference-in-means
tests of the variables for banks first grouped by whether they are under-performers or better-performers
(i.e., have a shortfall ratio greater than or equal to its median or less than its median) and then grouped by
whether they are a net acquirer of assets or either a net seller or inactive in buying and selling assets.  As
the wave of consolidation suggests, more banks are net acquirers (107) than are either net sellers or did not
buy or sell assets (62).  Table 2A indicates that under-performing banks (i.e., those with a high shortfall
ratio) tend to be smaller and less involved in acquiring assets.  Their higher proportion of insider
ownership suggests that the management of under-performing banks enjoys a higher degree of control, and
their lower proportion of outside block-holder ownership indicates that the discipline of outside monitoring
may be weaker at these banks.  While there is no significant difference in q ratios between under-
performing and better-performing banks, the investment opportunity ratio of under-performing banks is
significantly higher.  Hence, the under-performing banks are potentially more valuable than the better-
performing banks.  The under-performance of these banks represents a relatively larger consumption of
potential value by insiders in the form of agency goods.  The mean shortfall ratio of the under-performing
group is 32.5 percent compared to 5.5 percent for the better-performing group.  Apparently, the relatively
smaller level of outside block-holder monitoring and the larger degree of control by insiders results in
proportionately more consumption of agency goods.
Notably, better-performing banks are larger and have recently acquired a larger proportion of their
total assets than poorer-performing banks.  A comparison of net acquirers and net sellers or inactive banks14
reveals that net acquirers have a much lower shortfall ratio (13.6 percent) than banks that are either net
sellers or inactive in buying and selling (28.4 percent).  Net acquirers also have a higher q ratio in spite of
having relatively less valuable investment opportunities (i.e., a lower investment opportunities ratio). 
Hence, banks that are net acquirers tend to perform better.  In fact, 81 percent of banks in the better-
performing half of the sample are net acquirers.  But, there are important differences in performance that
seem to be correlated to managers’ degree of control and the level of outside monitoring—i.e., to the level
of managers’ entrenchment.  These differences suggest the possibility that banks may differ in their ability
to turn acquisitions into a value enhancing activity.  
In Table 2B we focus on those banks that are net acquirers of assets and compare under-
performing and better-performing net acquirers.  We find the same differences as we found in comparing
all better-performing banks with all under-performing banks.  Better-performing net acquirers are larger
and have relatively less valuable investment opportunities, their managers own less of the firm, and they
have a higher proportion of outside block-holder ownership.  Hence, their managers appear less entrenched
than those of under-performing net acquirers.  
The difference-in-means tests reported in Tables 2A and 2B are suggestive, but could be
misleading, since they fail to control for numerous relevant factors.  We now turn to our multivariate
analyses to determine whether the univariate comparisons are misleading or hold up in a more complex
analysis. 
4. Empirical Results on Entrenchment
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 present the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on financial
performance as a semi-elasticity,
(My/Mx )(x ) = My/Mln x  =  ["  + (½)3 "  x]x , (10) i h hihh j j h j h15
To save space we do not report the regression coefficients here, but they are available upon request from
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the authors.
which shows the change in performance (the shortfall ratio or Tobin’s q ratio) due to a proportional
change in the explanatory variable.   Note that because the regression equation (6) is quadratic, these
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effects will vary across banks.  The tables report the mean semi-elasticity of the bank-specific observations
in the designated subsample of banks.  We construct subsamples to investigate how the effects on
performance of managerial incentive variables and asset size variables differ for holding companies
grouped by the level of insider ownership, the size of their investment opportunity sets measured by the
frontier technique and by Tobin’s q ratio, the market-value shortfall ratio (i.e., inefficiency), and asset size. 
There are 16 subsamples in all.
In this section, we discuss our evidence related to managerial entrenchment.  In the next section,
we detail evidence related to whether holding companies with entrenched management fail to obtain the
benefits of size and asset acquisition that accrue to other companies.
4.1. Evidence of Managerial Entrenchment: Ownership Structure
4.1.1. Insider Ownership
An increase in insider ownership influences insiders’ consumption of agency goods in at least
three ways.  First, there is a “price” effect: the increase in insider ownership increases the opportunity cost
of agency goods, since a dollar more of agency goods reduces the value of insiders’ stake in the firm by the
larger ownership proportion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Second, there is an “income” effect: the
increase in insider ownership increases the insiders’ claim on the potential value of the firm, from which
insiders consume agency goods and produce value for both themselves and for outsiders.  Third, there is a
control effect: the increase in insider ownership increases the insiders’ control over the firm’s assets and,
hence, their ability to consume agency goods.16
See, for example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Barclay,
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Holderness, and Pontiff (1993), and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999).
See, for example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999).
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The literature on the effects of an increase in insider ownership has emphasized two effects: an
alignment-of-interests effect and a contrasting entrenchment effect.   While an increase in insider
16
ownership better aligns the incentives of outside and inside owners and reduces managers’ incentive to
consume agency goods, it also confers more control on insiders and gives them better ability to resist
market discipline and, hence, to consume agency goods.  Thus, the alignment-of-interest effect is
analogous to the “price” effect, while the entrenchment effect includes the control effect and its associated
“income” effect.
A number of studies of nonfinancial firms have adopted three divisions of their sample by the level
of insider ownership, 0 to 5 percent, 5 to 25 percent, and at least 25 percent, to test these contrasting
hypotheses about the effect on performance of insider ownership.   Using Tobin’s q ratio to measure
17
performance, they typically find that performance and insider ownership are positively related over the
range 0 to 5 percent, negatively related over the range 5 to 25 percent, and either positively or
insignificantly related above 25 percent.  These studies emphasize that the two hypotheses are not mutually
exclusive but, instead, represent concurrent incentives.  They usually attribute the improvement in
performance at lower levels of ownership to the dominance of the alignment-of-interest effect and the
decline at higher levels to the dominance of the entrenchment effect.  Stulz (1988) suggests a related
interpretation: at low levels of ownership, managers have a stronger incentive to promote the interests of
atomistic outside owners in a potential acquisition of their firm while, at higher levels of ownership,
managers can make an acquisition more difficult, perhaps to protect their control.  Consequently, their
firm’s ex ante value is higher at lower levels of ownership than at higher levels.
Our evidence of the effects of insider ownership on performance are qualitatively similar to those
found by these studies of nonfinancial firms.  The derivative of the shortfall ratio with respect to a
proportional change in insider ownership is displayed in the second column of Table 3.  The mean semi-17
DeYoung, Spong, and Sullivan (2001) used profit efficiency to gauge performance at small, closely held
18
banks and found that entrenchment becomes apparent at the 17 percent level of insider ownership.
The groups ordered by the investment opportunity ratio are defined by the following values: lowest third,
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1.006 to 1.042; middle third, 1.042 to 1.078; highest third, 1.079 to 1.319.  The groups ordered by the q ratio are
defined as follows: lowest third, 0.970 to 1.024; middle third, 1.024 to 1.044; highest third, 1.044 to 1.173.
elasticity for the entire sample of holding companies is not statistically significant, but most of the mean
semi-elasticities for the subsamples are significant and suggestive.  We follow the common practice of
dividing the sample into the three insider ownership groups.  An increase in insider ownership is
associated with a smaller market-value shortfall ratio (i.e., better performance) when insider ownership is
in the 0 to 5 percent range.  It is associated with a larger shortfall ratio (i.e., worse performance) when
inside ownership is at least 25 percent.   This suggests managerial entrenchment in banking occurs, and it
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occurs at higher levels of ownership than is typically found for nonfinancial firms.  Thus, our evidence
suggests that the entrenchment effect increases with insider ownership.
How the effect of insider ownership varies with the value of investment opportunities.  We also
examine how the relationship between insider ownership and bank performance varies with the value of
the firm’s investment opportunities.  To sort our sample, we use both the investment opportunity ratio and
Tobin’s q ratio to measure the value of investment opportunities.  We report the q ratio since it is often
used for this purpose; however, we prefer the investment opportunity ratio as a proxy for investment
opportunities because it minimizes measurement error owing to managerial inefficiency.  We divide the
sample into thirds defined by the size of each of these ratios.   The two ratios tell the same story.  A
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proportional increase in insider ownership at holding companies with the lowest investment opportunity
ratio is associated with a lower market-value shortfall ratio.  The same is true for banks with the lowest q
ratio.  In contrast, a proportional increase in insider ownership at banks in the two groups with higher
investment opportunities is associated with a higher shortfall ratio, and the magnitude of the increase is
greater in the third with the highest investment opportunity ratio and q ratio.  
Since, at any given investment in assets, a higher shortfall ratio implies greater consumption of
agency goods, an increase in ownership in the lowest third is negatively associated with the consumption18
of agency goods while, in the highest third, it is positively associated with their consumption.  Thus, an
increase in ownership at banks with poorer investment opportunities appears to align the interests of
insiders and outsiders more than it entrenches insiders.  Conversely, an increase in ownership at banks with
better investment opportunities is associated with greater entrenchment.  Dividing the sample by the
relative size of the investment opportunity set reveals that the entrenchment effect of an increase in
managerial ownership is strongest among banks with better investment opportunities.
The dichotomy in effect between banks with poorer and better investment opportunities suggests
that an increase in insider ownership interacts with the magnitude of a bank’s investment opportunities to
influence managers’ incentives to consume agency goods.  That is, the value of a bank’s investment
opportunities affects the relative sizes of the contrasting alignment-of-interest (price) effect and
entrenchment (income plus control) effects.  Consider two banks with the same investment in assets and
the same level of insider ownership but different investment opportunities. As noted previously, an
increase in insider ownership increases the opportunity cost of consuming agency goods and, consequently,
better aligns the interests of outside and inside owners.  The higher opportunity cost tends to discourage
the consumption of agency goods, but its effect is mitigated by the income and control effects, whose
magnitudes are influenced by the value of a bank’s investment opportunities (i.e., the level of “income”). 
An increase in insider ownership has a larger “income” effect on the consumption of agency goods at the
bank with the better investment opportunities, since the increase in ownership is multiplied by a larger
potential value from which agency goods are consumed.  That is, the increased ownership of managers is
worth more at the bank with more valuable investment opportunities; hence, it produces a larger “income”
effect on managers’ consumption of agency goods.  Similarly, the enhanced control implied by the increase
in ownership reinforces the larger “income” effect by improving the insiders’ ability to exploit the larger
opportunity set.  Thus, the sum of these two effects, which is more commonly called the entrenchment
effect, is likely to be larger for managers whose banks enjoy a more valuable set of investment
opportunities.  Our evidence indicates that the alignment-of-interests (price) effect dominates the
entrenchment (income plus control) effect for banks with the least valuable investment opportunities—an19
The shortfall ratio for the group with higher inefficiency ranges from 0.149 to 0.697 and for the group
20
with lower inefficiency, from 0.001 to 0.148.
The five size categories are the following (in thousands of dollars): smallest 1/5, from $159,860 to
21
$642,930; 2/5, from $653,644 to $1,361,236; 3/3, from $1,361,236 to $3,322,174; 4/5, from $3,322,174 to
$11,472,871; and (largest) 5/5, from $11,472,871 to $221,764,250.
increase in insider ownership is associated with improved performance (reduced consumption of agency
goods) at these banks.  On the other hand, the entrenchment effect dominates for the two-thirds with the
most valuable investment opportunities—an increase in insider ownership is related to worsened
performance (increased consumption of agency goods) at these banks.
How the effect of insider ownership varies with bank inefficiency.  We also examine how the sum
of the alignment-of-interest effect and entrenchment effect varies between more and less inefficient banks
by dividing the banks into two groups by their shortfall ratio.   A proportional increase in insider
20
ownership among banks in the less inefficient half is associated with a reduction in the shortfall ratio,
which implies that the alignment-of-interest effect dominates the entrenchment effect in this relatively
more efficient group of banks.  On the other hand, an increase in insider ownership among banks in the
more inefficient half is associated with an increase in the shortfall ratio, which suggests that the
entrenchment effect dominates the alignment-of-interest effect in this relatively inefficient group.  Hence,
higher inefficiency is associated with greater entrenchment, which is sensible, since the causality is likely
to run from entrenchment to inefficiency.
How the effect of insider ownership varies with bank size.  Finally, we divide the sample into five
groups by asset size.   Insider ownership is found to be positively associated with the shortfall ratio in the
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smallest three size groups, and negatively related in the largest size group.  Thus, entrenchment appears to
be stronger at smaller banks.
Summary of the effects of insider ownership.  The effects of a proportional increase in insider
ownership on the shortfall ratio strongly suggest that managers are entrenched at banks where they hold at
least 25 percent of common shares outstanding, where investment opportunities are in the upper two-thirds
of the sample, and in the three-fifths of the sample with the smallest total assets.  The evidence of20
The reader might be wondering why the significance seems to differ by insider ownership across the two
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performance measures we use.  First, while Tobin’s q ratio can be noisy, the stochastic frontier technique minimizes
the noise in the performance measure based upon it.  Second, the relationship between insider ownership and
performance may be of higher order than quadratic.  For example, if performance increases with insider ownership,
then decreases, then increases again as insiders own a large amount of the bank, the quadratic form we estimate can
capture one of these “turns” in performance but not both.  Hence, it may be that the shortfall and q ratio regressions
capture different “turns.”  One picks up significance for less entrenched groups and the other, more entrenched. 
Adding more variables to the regression equations could potentially pick this up, but the degrees of freedom would
be stretched very far.
entrenchment obtained from a variation in insider ownership is further reinforced by the positive
association between the shortfall ratio and insider ownership for the more inefficient half of the sample and
the negative relationship for the more efficient half.
4.1.2. Options Granted to Management
The third column of Table 3 reports the mean response of the shortfall ratio to a proportional
change in the fraction of outstanding common shares granted as options to insiders.  The effect of options
on the shortfall ratio is similar to that of ownership in most of the subsamples.  Notably, options are
positively associated with the shortfall ratio among banks in the higher two-thirds of the sample with better
investment opportunities measured both by the investment opportunity ratio and by Tobin’s q ratio, in the
more inefficient half of the sample, and in the smallest three-fifths of the sample.  Options are negatively
associated with the shortfall ratio among banks in the third of the sample with the lowest investment
opportunity and q ratios, in the less inefficient half, and in the largest two-fifths of banks, although these
relationships are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Note, though, that when bank
performance is measured by Tobin’s q ratio (see Table 4), we find that there is a significantly positive
relationship between options granted and performance for banks in the third of the sample with the lowest
investment opportunities and for the less inefficient half of the sample.   This suggests that an increase in
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options granted to insiders reduces agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders among banks with
lower investment opportunities and among banks that are relatively efficient, while it worsens
performance at relatively inefficient banks, at banks with better investment opportunities, and at smaller
banks.  The similarity in effect between ownership and options suggests that a high proportion of options
during this time period may have been in the money.21
4.1.3. Block-holder Ownership
The fourth columns of Tables 3 and 4 report the mean response of performance to a proportional
change in the fraction of outstanding shares held by outside block-holders, i.e., holders of more than 5
percent of outstanding shares.  Our regression results indicate that block-holder ownership does not have a
significant pattern of influence on bank performance whether it is measured by the shortfall ratio or by
Tobin’s q ratio.  This lack of significance is striking given the apparent importance of block-holders in the
univariate comparisons.
4.2. Evidence of Managerial Entrenchment: Investment Opportunities
An increase in the size of the investment opportunity set increases the potential value of the firm’s
assets and, hence, the size of the managers’ opportunity set for consuming agency goods, as well as for
producing asset value.  It also reduces the probability of financial distress and, thus, further enhances
managers’ ability to consume agency goods and to engage in defensive capital strategies.  The effect of an
increase in the potential value of the firm (measured by the size of the investment opportunity set) on the
firm’s shortfall ratio depends on the “income” elasticity of insiders’ demand for agency goods.  The
potential market value of the firm is the sum of its actual market value and the value that is consumed by
managers as agency goods.  If the demand for agency goods increases more than proportionately when the
potential value of the firm increases (i.e., if this demand is “income” elastic), then the actual market value
of the firm must increase less than proportionately.  Thus, the difference between the potential value and
the actual value (i.e., the shortfall) must increase more than proportionately.  Holding constant the
denominator of the shortfall ratio (i.e., the book value of assets net of goodwill), this would mean the
shortfall ratio would also increase more than proportionately.  In contrast, when the demand is inelastic,
the shortfall and the shortfall ratio must increase less than proportionately.
The fifth column of Table 3 presents the mean effect of a proportional change in the value of a
bank’s investment opportunities on performance measured by the shortfall ratio.  For the full sample and
for all subsamples where the semi-elasticity is statistically significant, a proportional increase in investment22
opportunities is associated with a more than proportional increase in the shortfall ratio.  The increased
shortfall ratio occurs for the subsamples in which our previous results suggest managerial entrenchment is
low: the group with the smallest insider ownership, the smallest investment opportunity set, the less
inefficient, and the largest asset sizes.  It might seem surprising to find that the consumption of agency
goods by relatively efficient managers, managers with low levels of ownership, and managers with less
valuable investment opportunities elastically responds to an increase in the value of their investment
opportunities.  But an analogy to consumer theory provides some intuition for this result.  Consider the
demand for a luxury good such as steak.  The income elasticity of the demand for steak is likely to be
greater for a consumer with low income than with high income—i.e., with less opportunity to consume
steak.  Similarly, the demand for agency goods appears to be elastic among managers with less “income”
and fewer opportunities to consume them.
The results reported in Table 4 for performance measured by Tobin’s q ratio give mixed evidence
in support of this intuition.  The semi-elasticities for managers with low levels of ownership and low
investment opportunity ratios are not significant at conventional levels, but their magnitudes suggest that
the managers in these groups of banks have an elastic demand for agency goods and are consistent with the
magnitudes of the corresponding effects measured by the shortfall ratio.  On the other hand, the three
statistically significant semi-elasticities in this column of results occur in subsamples where entrenchment
has appeared strong—the more inefficient half of the sample and the two-thirds of the sample with the
highest investment opportunities.  The semi-elasticities for these groups indicate that an increase in the
value of investment opportunities is associated with poorer performance (a lower q ratio).  Thus, the
combined evidence from the shortfall ratio and the q ratio suggests that managers across all types of
holding companies have an elastic demand for agency goods when faced with an improved investment
opportunity set.23
5. Empirical Results on Empire Building
The effects on financial performance of ownership structure and the size of the investment
opportunity set provide evidence of managerial entrenchment at smaller banks, at banks with better
investment opportunity sets, and at banks with relatively high insider ownership.  The consumption of
agency goods at banks with entrenched management might include empire building.  Empire building
would be suggested by a negative association between the firm’s financial performance and the level of
recently acquired assets and, perhaps, the level of current total assets.
We characterize a bank’s acquisition strategy with five measures: current total assets (at the end of
1994), the amount of assets acquired over the three year period 1992-1994, the amount of assets sold over
1992-1994, the number of institutions acquired over 1992-1994, and the number of institutions sold over
1992-1994.  During this three-year period, all banks that acquired assets also acquired at least one
institution, and all banks that sold assets also sold at least one institution.  Of the total of 169 banks, 72
banks acquired assets but did not sell assets, 6 banks sold assets but did not acquire assets, 37 banks both
acquired and sold assets, and the remaining 54 banks neither acquired nor sold assets.  A total of 107
banks are net acquirers of assets, and 8 banks are net sellers of assets.  On average, banks that were net
acquirers of assets, acquired assets over the three-year period equal to 20 percent of their assets at year-end
1994 and sold assets equal to 1.5 percent of year-end 1994 assets.  For net acquirers, the average number
of institutions acquired is 6.78 and sold, 0.67.  For net sellers of assets the average proportion of total
assets acquired is 0.9 percent, and the average sold is 9.2 percent.  For net sellers, the average number of
institutions acquired is 0.38 and sold, 1.38.
We estimate three size-related effects on performance: (i) the effect of a proportional change in the
total assets of a bank, controlling for the amount of acquired and sold assets, which is equivalent to a
proportional change in previously held assets—assets that are “home-grown” or that were acquired
before 1992; (ii) the effect of a proportional change in the amount of acquired assets, controlling for the
amount of total assets, which is equivalent to a change in the proportion of recently acquired assets to
previously held assets (since the amount of total assets is held constant); and (iii) the effect of a24
Some care must be taken when comparing the effects of an increase in assets on the q-ratio and on the
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market-value shortfall, since the q ratio measures achieved value and the shortfall measures lost market value.  An
increase in the book-value investment in total assets leads to an increase in the assets’ highest potential value, which
is their frontier value, and also to an increase in their achieved market value.  Suppose both the q-ratio and the ratio
of the frontier value to the book-value investment increase, and suppose that the frontier-value ratio increases more
than the q-ratio.  Then the market-value shortfall ratio will increase.  That is, the shortfall ratio and the q-ratio need
not move in opposite directions—an increase in a bank’s investment in assets can make it more inefficient relative to
proportional change in the amount of recently sold assets, controlling for the amount of total assets.  In
measuring these effects, we also control for the number of institutions acquired and sold.  The effects on
the shortfall ratio of these three types of variations are presented in Table 5, and the effects on Tobin’s q
ratio, in Table 6.
5.1. Effect of a Change in Total Assets
The first column of Table 5 and of Table 6 report the effect on performance of a proportional
increase in total assets, holding constant the amount of acquired and sold assets.  This represents internal
growth of the bank, or, more precisely, growth in previously held assets—assets that are “home-grown” or
acquired before 1992.  In the case of the market-value shortfall ratio, the pattern of statistical significance
and the sign of the semi-elasticities of the subsamples is similar to the pattern displayed by a variation in
insider ownership.  For the entire sample, an increase in total assets is associated with a large reduction in
the market-value shortfall ratio.  That is, an increase in assets is associated with better performance.  This
is also true for banks in the groups with the lowest level of insider ownership, the lowest growth
opportunities measured both by the stochastic frontier technique (i.e., the investment opportunity ratio) and
by Tobin’s q ratio, the lowest shortfall ratio, and the largest fifth of the sample—evidence against empire
building in these groups of banks.  Our earlier results suggest that these are groups in which managerial
entrenchment does not appear to be a problem.
When performance is measured by Tobin’s q ratio, increased asset-size is significantly associated
with better performance in banks with larger investment opportunities as measured by Tobin’s q and for
less efficient banks, two groups where entrenchment appears to be a problem given our earlier results
relating to ownership structure.    Combining the results for both of our measures of performance, it
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its potential value even though it increases its q-ratio.  In the case at hand, such a possibility can be ruled out, since
the q-ratio semi-elasticities are not only positive, but also very large.  In fact, they are virtually identical to the full
elasticities, which indicate that a one percent increase in total assets increases the q-ratio by 3.87 percent for banks in
the more inefficient half of the sample, by 5.16 percent for banks in the middle third sorted by Tobin’s q-ratio, and
by 1.48 percent for banks in upper third.
This problem does not arise for any of the other explanatory variables, such as the amounts of acquired
assets and sold assets, because the effect on performance of these variables holds constant total assets, which is
measured as the book-value investment in assets against which the shortfall is computed.
appears that an increase in assets (not obtained by acquisition) is associated with better financial
performance at most banks.  This might reflect the existence of scale economies for “home-grown” assets,
or the causality may work in the opposite direction: better performing banks gain customers and grow
larger while poor performers fail to grow or even lose customers.
5.2. Effect of a Change in Acquired Assets
The effect on performance of a proportional increase in the amount of acquired assets is shown in
the second column of Table 5 and of Table 6.  In contrast to an increase in total assets, some banks appear
to worsen their performance by acquiring assets.  Since total assets are held constant when we measure this
semi-elasticity, it is also equivalent to a change in the composition of total assets, where recently acquired
assets increase at the expense of previously held assets.  This shift in the proportion allows us to compare
the contribution to value of previously held assets and recently acquired assets.  A proportional increase in
acquired assets is associated with an increase in the market-value shortfall ratio (i.e., worse performance)
for banks in groups in the middle level of insider ownership, the middle and highest levels of investment
opportunities measured both by the investment opportunity ratio and by the q ratio, the more inefficient
half of banks, and the smallest four-fifths of banks in the sample.  Hence, the assets these banks acquire
seem less valuable than the assets they hold.  These groups of banks are essentially the same ones for
which an increase in insider ownership is associated with an increase in the shortfall ratio, which suggests
that the positive relationship between the amount of acquired assets and the shortfall ratio may be
associated with entrenched management.26
Further evidence for this entrenchment hypothesis from the effects on the shortfall ratio is weaker. 
It is true that the groups for which entrenchment does not appear to be a problem, i.e., where an increase in
insider ownership is associated with a decline in the shortfall ratio—the lowest level of insider ownership,
the smallest investment opportunity sets, the less inefficient half, and the largest one-fifth—all exhibit a
negative relationship between acquired assets and the shortfall ratio, i.e., their acquisition of assets appears
to be value enhancing.  However, none of these semi-elasticities is statistically significant.  Strikingly,
though, as shown in Table 6, the weakness of this evidence disappears when Tobin’s q ratio is used to
measure performance: a proportional increase in acquired assets is associated with a statistically
significant, improved financial performance for these groups in which entrenchment appears low.  Only the
effect for the less inefficient group is insignificantly positive.
This evidence suggests that the assets less entrenched managers acquire are more valuable than the
assets they hold.  Thus, it appears that banks where increased insider ownership is associated with poorer
financial performance are also banks where acquired assets are associated with poorer performance and
vice versa.  The benefits of acquired assets appear to accrue to banks whose insiders are not entrenched.
5.3. Effect of Selling Assets
Selling assets raises the question of how such an activity contributes to an acquisition strategy and
whether it really reflects poor performance.  Most banks in our sample that sell assets also acquire assets
(37 sell and acquire while 6 only sell assets).  For the 37 banks that engaged in both acquiring and selling
of assets, on average, the acquired assets over 1992-1994 equal to 21.9 percent of their total assets as of the
end of 1994, while they sold assets equal to only 4.9 percent of year-end 1994 assets.  These banks sold an
average of 2.03 institutions, and acquired an average of 11.1 institutions.  They are relatively efficient. 
Compared to the full sample whose mean shortfall ratio is 19.1 percent and whose median is 14.9, their
average shortfall ratio is 7.4 percent, and their median, 4.5 percent.  In contrast, the 6 banks that only sell
assets, sold an average 8.7 percent of their assets and an average of 1.33 institutions.  Their mean shortfall27
ratio is 25.3 percent.  These efficiency differences suggest that relatively efficient managers may be using
sales to finance acquisitions, while relatively inefficient managers are shrinking their asset portfolios.
The third column of Table 5 and of Table 6 gives the effect on performance of a proportional
change in the amount of sold assets.  Interestingly, an increase in the amount of sold assets is associated
with a smaller shortfall ratio, i.e., with better performance, for all groups except for those in the largest
two-fifths by asset size and the middle third of the investment opportunity ratio.  This effect is statistically
significant at the 0.10 or better level for the groups that exhibit managerial entrenchment.  For the other
groups where entrenchment is not as apparent, the reduction in the shortfall is much larger, but not
statistically significant at conventional levels (the p-values are 0.177 or lower).  However, when
performance is measured by the q ratio (as shown in Table 6), the significance levels increase to
conventional levels.  Here, the groups showing the least entrenchment—the less inefficient half, the lowest
insider ownership, and the lowest investment opportunities—all show a statistically significant, positive
association between asset sales and performance.  In addition, this significant positive association is found
for many of the groups exhibiting entrenchment.   In short, a larger amount of sold assets is associated
with improved financial performance at all but the largest banks in the sample.
Not only are the qualitative results based on the shortfall ratio and the q ratio in agreement, the
quantitative results are also similar.  Comparing the magnitude of the effect on the q ratio between groups
with high and low levels of insider ownership and large and small investment opportunity sets, it is clear
that a larger amount of sold assets is associated with a larger increase in the q ratio for the groups with
less entrenched managers.  Although these differences in magnitudes suggest that a larger amount of sold
assets is associated with a larger improvement in performance at banks with less entrenched managers,
even banks with more entrenched managers obtain improved performance from asset sales.  This evidence
is clear for all but the largest banks in the sample.
Why are asset sales so generally beneficial for all but the largest banks?  While selling assets
would superficially seem at odds with exploiting scale economies, there are a variety of reasons asset sales
might be associated with better financial performance.  Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that a manager28
An increase in a firm’s focus involves an increase in its return risk.  Entrenched managers who avoid risk
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to protect their relatively undiversified human capital are not likely to increase the focus of their firms.
only divests assets that others can manage better and that competition among potential buyers will drive up
the price of these assets to their highest market value, which may represent the willingness of an
entrenched buyer to overpay.  Consequently, they contend that asset sales should improve the seller’s
performance.  On the other hand, the performance effects of asset acquisitions depend on whether
managers are entrenched.  Entrenched managers are likely to sacrifice value to acquire assets that further
their own objectives.  Lang, Poulson, and Stulz (1995) find evidence that sellers benefit on average from
sales, but they note that the market discounts the announcement returns of sellers whom it expects to use
the proceeds to pursue non-value-maximizing managerial objectives.  John and Ofek (1995) also find that
sellers of assets improve their financial performance in the three years following the sale, provided the
divested assets increase the firm’s focus.   
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We obtain an interesting asymmetry of effect between acquisitions of assets and sales of assets for
banks with entrenched management, which confirms Shleifer and Vishny’s contention: while a larger
amount of acquired assets is associated with worsened performance at banks with entrenched
management, a larger amount of sold assets is related to improved performance.  This asymmetry is not
observed at banks in the groups not exhibiting entrenchment: both larger amounts of acquired assets and
larger amounts of sold assets are associated with improved performance.
While nearly all groups of banks seem to benefit from an increase in the amount of sold assets, it
should not be forgotten that the positive performance effect is much smaller at banks with entrenched
management.  Apparently, entrenched managers do not manage the proceeds of their sales as well as other
managers.
6. Conclusions
The relationship between insider ownership and financial performance suggests that managerial
entrenchment is present at banks with higher levels of managerial ownership, better investment29
opportunities, higher inefficiency, and smaller asset size.  While an increase in asset size not obtained by
acquisition is associated with improved performance for most banks, an increase in the amount of acquired
assets is associated with improved performance at banks not exhibiting managerial entrenchment and with
worsened performance at banks exhibiting entrenchment.  Moreover, while an increase in the amount of
sold assets is related to improved performance for most banks, the performance effect is much stronger for
banks not exhibiting managerial entrenchment.  The interesting asymmetry of effect for asset sales and
acquisitions for entrenched managers—sales are associated with improved performance, while acquisitions
are related to worsened performance—is consistent with empire building strategies that sacrifice value.  In
contrast, both asset sales and asset acquisitions are associated with improved performance at banks not
exhibiting managerial entrenchment.  Nevertheless, entrenched and non-entrenched managers appear to
have an elastic demand for agency goods when the value of their investment opportunities increases.
Our results suggest that while scale and scope economies have likely been driving forces of the
consolidation in the banking industry, not all mergers and acquisitions that lead to larger banks are value-
enhancing.  When bank management is entrenched, some of this acquisition activity has likely been
associated with empire building, i.e., with poorer bank performance.30
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
169 bank holding companies.  Data pertain to 1994 unless otherwise stated.  All dollars in thousands.
Variable Sample Mean Median Standard Deviation
Book-value of assets $ 11,863,901.25 $ 1,976,286.00 $ 27,609,893.29   
Book-value of assets, net of goodwill $ 11,796,318.97 $ 1,972,085.00 $ 27,384,207.94
Market-value shortfall =  $ 429,071.75 $ 364,043.56 $ 351,753.86
Frontier market-value of assets ! Actual
market-value of assets, net of goodwill
Shortfall ratio = 0.191 0.149 0.164
Market-value shortfall / Book-value of
assets, net of goodwill
Tobin’s q ratio = 1.036 1.033 0.033
Market-value of assets / Book-value of
assets, net of goodwill
Insider ownership = 12.885 7.264 13.449
Percentage of outstanding shares held by
officers and managers
Options granted =  0.341 0.148 0.576
Percentage of outstanding shares
represented by stock options granted to
senior managers
Outside block-holder ownership = 3.307 0.000 6.555
Percentage of outstanding shares held by
outside block-holders (holders of 5
percent or more of outstanding shares)
Size of investment opportunity set =  $12,102,031.87 $2,073,815.00 $27,758,651.86
Frontier market-value of assets (given
the geographic location of the holding
company’s operations)
Investment opportunity ratio =  1.073 1.057 0.054
Size of the investment opportunity set /
Book-value of assets, net of goodwill, at
end of 1994
Assets acquired, 1992-1994 $ 2,314,368.51 $ 169,712.00 $ 9,120,196.28
Assets acquired, 1992-1994 / Book-value of 0.127 0.076 0.142
assets, net of goodwill, at end of 1994
Assets sold, 1992-1994 $ 153,261.78 $ 0.00 $ 610,395.64
Assets sold, 1992-1994 / Book-value of assets, 0.014 0.000 0.036
net of goodwill, at end of 1994
Number of institutions acquired, 1992-1994 4.308 2.000 8.362
Number of institutions sold, 1992-1994 0.491 0.000 1.14535
Table 2A
Difference-in-Means Tests Across Subsamples
The first two columns compare under-performing banks to better-performing banks.  The second two
columns compare banks that were net acquirers of assets to those that were net sellers of assets or that did not
engage in buying or selling assets.  Values in bold are significantly different from each other at the 0.05
level.  (Note that we used a standard t-test to compare means when an F-test did not reject the hypothesis of
equal variances across the subsamples, and we used Welch’s (1933) t-test when an F-test did reject the
hypothesis of equal variances.)  All dollars in thousands.
Variable Performing Performing Net Acquirers Net Sellers of
Under- Better- Banks that are Banks that are
Banks (Shortfall Banks (Shortfall of Assets Assets or Neither
Ratio $ Median) Ratio < Median) Acquirers nor
Sellers
Number of banks 85 84 107 62
Book-value of assets $ 14,701,751.18 $ 6,966,321.55 $ 904,908.39 $ 22,953,358.32
Book-value of assets, net of $ 14,601,319.66 $ 6,955,430.67
goodwill
$ 901,818.08 $ 22,820,516.30
Market-value shortfall $ 418,307.34 $ 447,649.01 $ 361,673.78 $ 497,272.07
Shortfall ratio 0.325 0.055 0.136 0.284
Tobin’s q ratio 1.036 1.037 1.041 1.029
Insider ownership 18.131 7.577 10.535 16.940
Options granted 0.439  0.241 0.212 0.563
Outside block-holder 3.395 3.154
ownership
1.738 4.895
Size of investment opportunity
set
$ 980,036.35 $ 23,356,432.11 $ 14,985,624.43 $ 7125509.23
Investment opportunity ratio 1.109 1.037 1.059 1.098
Assets acquired, 1992-1994 $ 107,134.20 $ 4,547,879.42 $ 3,654,424.54 $ 1,691.16
Assets acquired, 1992-1994 /
Book-value of assets, net of
goodwill, at end of 1994
0.101 0.154 0.200 0.001
Assets sold, 1992-1994 $ 7,272.34  $ 300,987.16 $ 227,692.20 $ 24,809.27
Assets sold, 1992-1994 / 0.010 0.017 0.015 0.012
Book-value of assets, net of
goodwill, at end of 1994
Number of institutions
acquired, 1992-1994
1.106 7.548 6.776 0.048
Number of institutions sold, 
1992-1994
0.118 0.869 0.673 0.17736
Table 2B
Difference-in-Means Tests for Under-Performing and Better-Performing Net Acquirers
The two columns compare under-performing and better-performing banks that are net acquirers to gain
evidence on the potential for empire building among under-performing banks.  Values in bold are
significantly different from each other at the 0.05 level.  (Note that we used a standard t-test to compare
means when an F-test did not reject the hypothesis of equal variances across the subsamples and we used
Welch’s (1933) t-test when an F-test did reject the hypothesis of equal variances.)  All dollars in thousands.
Variable Under-Performing Banks Better-Performing Banks
Net Acquirers that are Net Acquirers that are
(Shortfall Ratio $ Median) (Shortfall Ratio < Median)
Number of banks 39 68
Book-value of assets $ 1,070,206.36 $ 22,519,843.06
Book-value of assets, net of goodwill $ 1,065,656.96 $ 22,364,420.43
Market-value shortfall $ 358,628.33 $ 452,535.01
Shortfall ratio 0.281 0.053
Tobin’s q ratio 1.048 1.036
Insider ownership 16.046 7.375
Options granted 0.212  0.212
Outside block-holder ownership 1.657 4.391
Size of investment opportunity set $ 1,150,420.54 $ 22,920,520.78
Investment opportunity ratio 1.095 1.038
Assets acquired, 1992-1994 $ 231,641.33 $ 5,617,491.38
Assets acquired, 1992-1994 / Book-value of assets, 0.218 0.190
net of goodwill, at end of 1994
Assets sold, 1992-1994 $ 3,134.82  $ 356,477.29
Assets sold, 1992-1994 / Book-value of assets, net
of goodwill, at end of 1994
0.005 0.021
Number of institutions acquired, 1992-1994 2.385 9.294




The Effects of Managerial Incentives on the Market-Value Shortfall Ratio
This table reports the estimated change in market-value shortfall ratio due to a proportional change in the incentive
variable, (My/Mx)(ln x), based on equation (6).  The reported values are means over bank holding companies in the ij j
full sample or in the designated subsample.  The values in parentheses are two-tailed probabilities.  Values in bold
are significant at least at the 0.10 level.
Change in Shortfall Ratio due to a proportional change in...
Mean semi-elasticity
for the subsample . . . Insider Options Granted Outside Size of Investment
Ownership Block-Holder Opportunity Set
Ownership
All BHCs  !0.011    (0.407)   12.551    (0.053)   !0.009    (0.796)     !0.025    (0.502)
Insider ownership
     0 to 5 %   !0.041    (0.597)   !0.080    (0.470)  !0.098    (0.003)   38.148    (0.053)
     5 to 25 %  !0.004    (0.781)     0.006    (0.654)   !0.000    (0.975)     0.859    (0.450)
     $ 25 %     0.003    (0.838)     0.000    (0.983)     0.843    (0.426)    0.133    (0.017)
Investment
opportunity ratio
     lowest 1/3   !0.079    (0.242)   !0.071    (0.542)  !0.127    (0.000)    37.592    (0.050)
     middle 1/3   !0.010    (0.127)    !0.310    (0.702)    0.024    (0.034)     0.018    (0.007)
     highest 1/3     0.005    (0.403)    !0.082    (0.746)    0.070    (0.000)     0.034    (0.000)
Tobin’s q ratio
     lowest 1/3   !0.075    (0.268)   !0.080    (0.469)  !0.119    (0.001)    37.485    (0.049)
     middle 1/3    0.017    (0.132)         0.002    (0.742)    !0.265    (0.707)     0.015    (0.026)
     highest 1/3     0.003    (0.507)    !0.014    (0.958)    0.069    (0.000)     0.033    (0.014)
Market-value
shortfall
     lower 1/2   !0.047    (0.300)   !0.054    (0.472)  !0.078    (0.001)    25.425    (0.049)
     higher 1/2     0.003    (0.512)    !0.172    (0.585)    0.054    (0.000)     0.028    (0.001)
Asset size
     smallest 1/5     0.004    (0.490)      0.052    (0.842)    0.081    (0.001)     0.048    (0.051)
                   2/5   !0.001    (0.761)    !0.230    (0.483)    0.043    (0.001)     0.012    (0.084)
                   3/5     0.006    (0.352)    !0.632    (0.278)    0.014    (0.236)     0.018    (0.003)
                   4/5  !0.011    (0.517)   !0.005    (0.816)   !0.015    (0.382)      0.076    (0.964)
     largest   5/5   !0.120    (0.228)   !0.119    (0.500)  !0.183    (0.001)     63.098   (0.046)38
Table 4 
The Effects of Managerial Incentives on Tobin’s q Ratio
This table reports the estimated change in market-value shortfall ratio due to a proportional change in the incentive
variable, (My/Mx)(ln x), based on equation (6).  The reported values are means over bank holding companies in the ij j
full sample or in the designated subsample.  The values in parentheses are two-tailed probabilities.  Values in bold
are significant at least at the 0.10 level.
Change in Tobin’s q Ratio due to a proportional change in...
Mean semi-
elasticity for the Insider Options Granted
subsample . . . Ownership
Outside  Size of Investment
Block-Holder Opportunity Set
Ownership
All BHCs  !0.005    (0.385)    0.004    (0.460)      0.005    (0.602)   !1.730    (0.402)
Insider ownership
     0 to 5 %  !0.003    (0.726)    0.010    (0.566)    0.015    (0.528)    !5.911    (0.345)
     5 to 25 %  !0.003    (0.449)    0.002    (0.570)  !0.002    (0.458)      0.114    (0.764)
     $ 25 %  !0.011    (0.687)  !0.000    (0.999)    0.004    (0.163)      0.396    (0.320)
Investment
opportunity ratio
     lowest 1/3  !0.004    (0.713)    0.019    (0.258)    0.015    (0.562)    !5.332    (0.378)
     middle 1/3  !0.005    (0.328)  !0.001    (0.703)  !0.000    (0.899)      0.140    (0.616)
     highest 1/3  !0.005    (0.542)  !0.002    (0.305)      0.067    (0.477)  !0.005    (0.045)
Tobin’s q ratio
     lowest 1/3  !0.013    (0.255)    0.026    (0.539)      1.167    (0.801)    0.014    (0.042)
     middle 1/3  !0.005    (0.265)        0.002    (0.882)  !0.003    (0.365)    !5.373    (0.008)
     highest 1/3    0.004    (0.446)  !0.002    (0.374)    0.004    (0.440)    !1.563    (0.023)
Market-value
shortfall
     lower 1/2  !0.013    (0.131)    0.007    (0.616)      0.617    (0.889)    0.011    (0.054)
     higher 1/2    0.004    (0.401)  !0.003    (0.746)    0.002    (0.680)    !4.050    (0.014)
Asset size
     smallest 1/5  !0.005    (0.586)  !0.006    (0.395)  !0.001    (0.386)      0.037    (0.689)
                   2/5  !0.002    (0.742)  !0.001    (0.790)    0.001    (0.680)      0.102    (0.383)
                   3/5  !0.006    (0.164)  !0.002    (0.471)      0.124    (0.529)  !0.003    (0.035)
                   4/5  !0.000    (0.993)  !0.001    (0.852)  !0.006    (0.223)    !0.250    (0.611)
     largest   5/5  !0.009    (0.564)    0.032    (0.199)    0.032    (0.419)      8.610    (0.392)39
Table 5  
The Effects of Asset Size, Acquisitions, and Sales on the Market-Value Shortfall Ratio
This table reports the estimated change in market-value shortfall ratio due to a proportional change in bank holding
company size, acquisitions, and sales, (My/Mx)(ln x), based on equation (6).  The reported values are means over ij j
bank holding companies in the full sample or in the designated subsample.  The values in parentheses are two-tailed
probabilities.  Values in bold are significant at least at the 0.10 level.
Change in Shortfall Ratio due to a proportional change in...
Mean semi-elasticity for the
subsample . . . Total Assets Acquired Assets Sold Assets
All BHCs !12.483  (0.055)  !0.021  (0.834)  !0.140  (0.167)
Insider ownership
     0 to 5 %  !0.117  (0.722)  !0.424  (0.176) !37.766  (0.056)
     5 to 25 %   !0.944  (0.400)    0.025  (0.005)  !0.010  (0.070)
     $ 25 %   !0.889  (0.383)    0.013  (0.225)  !0.009  (0.045)
Investment opportunity ratio
     lowest 1/3  !0.093  (0.757)  !0.413  (0.167) !37.263  (0.053)
     middle 1/3     0.208  (0.784)    0.024  (0.040)    0.006  (0.091)
     highest 1/3     0.052  (0.834)    0.007  (0.011)  !0.007  (0.002)
Tobin’s q ratio
     lowest 1/3  !0.089  (0.770)  !0.403  (0.175) !37.167  (0.052)
     middle 1/3     0.172  (0.804)      !0.005  (0.240)    0.021  (0.017)
     highest 1/3   !0.013  (0.957)    0.005  (0.041)  !0.008  (0.002)
Market-value shortfall
     lower 1/2  !0.052  (0.802)  !0.272  (0.177) !25.246  (0.052)
     higher 1/2     0.130  (0.663)    0.009  (0.010)  !0.009  (0.002)
Asset size
     smallest 1/5   !0.071  (0.763)    0.004  (0.042)  !0.012  (0.002)
                   2/5     0.183  (0.557)    0.009  (0.012)  !0.009  (0.002)
                   3/5     0.545  (0.338)    0.017  (0.003)  !0.006  (0.036)
                   4/5   !0.255 (0.878)    0.048  (0.017)    0.031  (0.012)
     largest   5/5  !0.183  (0.715)    0.699  (0.159) !62.434 (0.060)40
Table 6  
The Effects of Asset Size and Acquisitions on Tobin’s q Ratio
This table reports the estimated change in Tobin’s q ratio due to a proportional change in bank holding company
size, acquired assets, and sold assets, (My/Mx)(ln x), based on equation (6).  A scaled proportional change in total ij j
assets considers the effect of a change in total assets that is due only to a change in acquired assets, that is, it assumes
no internal growth.  The reported values are means over bank holding companies in the full sample or in the
designated subsample.  The values in parentheses are two-tailed probabilities.  Values in bold are significant at least
at the 0.10 level.
Change in Tobin’s q Ratio due to a proportional change in...
Mean semi-elasticity for the
subsample . . . Total Assets Acquired Assets Sold Assets
All BHCs   0.048  (0.076)   0.041   (0.063)    1.643   (0.428)
Insider ownership
     0 to 5 %    5.637   (0.370)   0.161  (0.068)   0.124   (0.073)
     5 to 25 %  !0.119   (0.751) !0.004  (0.151)   0.003   (0.008)
     $ 25 %  !0.388   (0.311) !0.004  (0.261)   0.003   (0.002)
Investment opportunity ratio
     lowest 1/3    5.071   (0.404)   0.147  (0.068)   0.119   (0.071)
     middle 1/3  !0.140   (0.607) !0.005  (0.196)   0.001   (0.401)
     highest 1/3  !0.063   (0.460) !0.001  (0.204)   0.002   (0.001)
Tobin’s q ratio
     lowest 1/3  !1.856  (0.774)   0.108  (0.103)   0.104   (0.014)
     middle 1/3   0.038  (0.240)   0.016   (0.548)    5.334  (0.008)    
     highest 1/3 !0.004  (0.600)   0.003   (0.529)    1.581  (0.021)
Market-value shortfall
     lower 1/2  !0.783    (0.860)   0.074  (0.137)   0.070   (0.015)
     higher 1/2   0.021  (0.359)   0.013   (0.539)    4.041    (0.013)
Asset size
     smallest 1/5  !0.034    (0.678) !0.001  (0.266)   0.003   (0.001)
                   2/5  !0.099    (0.373) !0.001  (0.226)   0.002   (0.002)
                   3/5  !0.124    (0.517) !0.003  (0.143)   0.003   (0.000)
                   4/5    0.247    (0.610) !0.008  (0.191) !0.001   (0.814)
     largest   5/5    8.173    (0.419)   0.249  (0.063)   0.198   (0.071)